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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

mon-carrier liability in situations such as these. It recognizes the state's
interest in protecting its domiciliaries 41 from an archaic application of
the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel in other forums. 142 Furthermore,
it accentuates judicial aversion to inconsistent results. 143 Finally, it
safeguards against "forum shopping." However, there is a paucity of
case law in New York concerning the offensive use of a judgment by
one not a party to the prior action, 144 and it is conceivable that under
slightly altered circumstances an opposite conclusion will be reached. 145
Nevertheless, Hart should provide guidance to the courts in their continuing venture away from the doctrinaire of Glaser v. Huette.146
CPLR 3213: Judgment obtained against insured cannot serve as the

basis for a 3213 motion against the insurer.
CPLR 3213, as recently amended, permits the service of a summons and motion for summary judgment in lieu of a complaint in
actions based upon "an instrument for the payment of money only or
upon any judgment." The addition of the word "any" was intended to
avoid a construction which would limit the section's operation to

money judgments only.147 However, as illustrated in Holmes v. Allstate
Insurance Co.,148 this clarification may, in turn, present new problems
of interpretation. 149
141

Cf. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 172 NX.2d 526

(1961).
142 The court noted that most jurisdictions continue to observe the mutuality doctrine despite the fact that it is a "dead letter" in New York by virtue of B. P. DeWitt,
Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967).
143 See, e.g., Schwartz v. Public Administrator, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 246 N.E.2d 725, 298
N.Y.S.2d 955 (1969).
144 Nevertheless, the offensive use of a judgment was undoubtedly sanctioned in B. R.
DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967).
Valid precedent for Hart can be found in United States v. United Air Lines, 216 F.
Supp. 709, 725-29 (E.D. Wash. 1962), aff'd sub nom. United Air Lines v. Wiener, 335
F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 951 (1964).
145 In Schwartz v. Public Administrator, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 72, 246 N.E.2d 725, 729, 298
N.Y.S.2d 955, 961 (1969), the following factors were listed as determinant of whether a
party had had his day in court: the size of the daim, the forum of the prior litigation,

the use of initiative, the extent of the litigation, the competence and experience of
counsel, the availability of new evidence, indications of a compromise verdict, differences
in the applicable law, and forseeability of future litigation. See also Note, Collateral
Estoppel: The Demise of Mutuality, 52 CoRaNEr L.Q. 724, 728-29 (1967).
146 232 App. Div. 119, 249 N.Y.S. 374 (ist Dep't), aff'd mem., 256 N.Y. 686, 177 N.E.
193 (1931).
147"It is the purpose of the proposed amendment to enable a judgment creditor
to utilize a motion under 3213 regardless of whether
who holds a foreign judgment ...
it awards a sum of money or any other relief." BENmm's CPLR 3213, at 32-11 (pam-

phlet ed. 1969).
148 33 App. Div. 2d 96, 305 N.Y.S.2d 563 (Ist Dep't 1969).
149

Cf. Seaman-Andwall Corp. v. Wright Mach. Corp., 31 App. Div. 2d 186, 295

N.Y.S.2d 752 (Ist Dep't 1968); Orenstein v. Orenstein, 59 Misc. 2d 565, 299 N.Y.S.2d 648
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In Holmes, the plaintiff commenced his "motion-action"1 50 against
the Allstate Insurance Company' 5 ' after obtaining a judgment against
one allegedly insured by that company. 52 The lower court granted
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. However, focusing on the
propriety of utilizing the section in these circumstances, the appellate
division reversed on the ground that the action was "not the simple
' 53
action 'based' upon a judgment as contemplated by CPLR 3213."'
In reaching this conclusion, the court first considered the purpose of
a 3213 motion: to provide an effective means of promptly obtaining a
judgment where the defendant's liability would be established prima
facie from the terms of the judgment; in these circumstances, a formal
complaint is superfluous. 5 4
In contrast, an action based upon section 167 of the Insurance
Law' 5 5 could not be viewed by the court as an action in which a complaint could be dispensed with: the prior judgment was not rendered
against the insurer and the action was not therefore a simple enforcement action. 56 Although the insurer is bound by facts necessarily determined in the prior action against its insured, the basis of the insurer's liability, as an indemnitor, "depends upon facts dehors the
terms of the judgment."' 57 Consequently, the appellate division labelled the prior judgment as merely one of the transactions or occurrences to be established by the plaintiff, and concluded that "orderly
procedure requires pleading statements setting forth plainly and
158
concisely the transactions and all occurrences intended to be proved.'
(App. T. 2d Dep't 1969), rev'g 58 Misc. 2d 377, 295 N.YS.2d 116 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Queens
County 1968); All-O-Matic Mfg. Corp. v. Shields, 59 Misc. 2d 199, 298 N.Y.S.2d 268
(Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1969). See also The Quarterly Survey, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. Raw.
335-38 (1969).
150 Because an action under CPLR 3213 can be prosecuted with the facility of a
motion, it has been styled a "motion-action." 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3213, commentary
829 (1970).
151 The action was brought pursuant to Insurance Law section 167(1)(b) which
prescribes that if a judgment against the insured remains unsatisfied for thirty days after
service of notice of entry of the judgment, "an action . . . may be maintained against
N.Y. INS. LAW § 167(l)(b) (McKinney 1966).
the insurer ....
152 There was some controversy as to whether or not Allstate had improperly discontinued coverage of the policy prior to the accident. However, since the case was
decided upon a procedural ground, the references in both the majority and dissenting
opinions regarding the merits of the case and whether a triable issue of fact indeed
existed, should be recognized as dictum.
'53 33 App. Div. 2d at 98, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 566.
154 Fissr REP. 91.
155 N.Y. INs. LAw § 167 (McKinney 1966).
156 The action is upon a cause of action unknown at common law, whereas "the
action on a judgment was maintainable at and well known to the common law." 33 App.
Div. 2d at 97, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 565.
157 Id. at 98, 305 N.Y.S.2d 565.
158 Id. at 99, 305 N.Y.S2d at 567.

